An intellectual biography of Niels Bohr (Joint work with Anja Skaar Jacobsen)

Relativity theory might seem less philosophically provocative than quantum physics, and easier to read literally, i.e., as telling us how things are (in themselves). In fact, one might say that there is something of a consensus among philosophers about how to read relativity theory. But that has not always been the case — and I’m convinced that if there is a consensus now, then it rests on some indefensible presuppositions.

It’s possible to make up some precise (mathematically rigorous) versions of familiar concepts. For example, in the 19th century, mathematicians came up with definitions for concepts such as a function being continuous, or of a collection being infinite. In the 20th century, mathematical logicians continued this practice by proposing definitions for concepts such as provability, truth (in a structure), and equivalence (of theories).

But some philosophers complain about this methodology, saying
that the notion of equivalence is not "formal", or even more
extremely, that it's a bad idea to talk about *theories* in
the first place – rather than about more solid things such
as *facts*. I remain convinced that meta-theoretic concepts
(i.e., concepts about our representations and how they relate to the
world) are useful, and that explication of such concepts is a
valuable practice. But it’s important to clarify what we attend to
achieve via this methodology.

- Math for aspiring philosophers (of physics and science)
- How logic works
- Is quantum mechanics irrational?