This course investigates the concept of objectivity, with special reference to science and religion – both from historical and conceptual points of view. While there will be plenty of analytic philosophy, we will also find it helpful to read some historical sources, most notably the great critic of objectivity: Søren Kierkegaard.
The desire to find a “recipe” for achieving objectivity has been strong among philosophers in the European and Anglo-American traditions. However, the cure has usually been worse than the disease: the pretension of perfect objectivity leads people to being even less objective than they might have been. Take, for example, the dialectical method of Hegel, the bad outcomes of which were pointed out most colorfully by Kierkegaard. Or take the failed attempts of the logical positivists to define purely objective science.
Despite these repeated failures, we aren’t ready to resign ourselves to the idea that objectivity is an illusion, or that there is simply not point to trying to be objective. For example, shouldn’t a scientist try to be objective in reporting the results of her experiments? And shouldn’t journalists try to be objective in their reporting? For that matter, shouldn’t professors try to be objective in evaluating the work of their students?
More generally, what does it mean to be objective? What is the point in trying to be objective? And how can we achieve objectivity? Are there places and times when it’s not a virtue to be objective?
We will also consider the scope of objectivity in the social sciences, as well as the relationship between objectivity and values in accepting scientific theories, making religious commitments, and forming beliefs in other domains.
Format: This course meets twice a week for 80 minutes and is discussion-based.
Under construction. The following is our scratchpad, which will be updated on an ongoing basis.
Alison Wylie, Why standpoint matters?
Heather Douglas, The irreducible complexity of objectivity jstor
Douglas raises a worry: that saying that “x is objective” amounts to nothing more than a sort of epistemic endorsement or power move. The same kind of worry is explored from a different angle in Rosen, Objectivity and modern idealism
Lidal Dror on whether it could be an epistemic advantage to be oppressed
Quanbeck, Resolving to believe: Kierkegaard’s direct doxastic voluntarism doi:10.1111/phpr.13055
Kierkegaard: selections from De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Philosophical Fragments, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Works of Love
Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Hong Translation): Vol 1
Kierkegaard, Truth is subjectivity notes
Lara Buchak on faith
Rudner, The scientist qua scientist makes value judgments jstor
See also the reply from Richard Jeffrey
Robert Adams, Kierkegaard’s arguments against objective reasoning in religion
Robert Adams, Leap of faith
The value-free ideal for science
Perspective
Standpoint epistemology
Ethics of belief
Epistemic injustice
Inductive risk